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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DON GERALD WILLIAMS; JAMES
ALLEN SCOTT; JEANETTE WALTON, Administratrix of the Estate
of ROBERT WALTON, Deceased;
BOYD SIMMONS; ANGELO MELO;
WAULSTINE McNEELEY and
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.

Case No.
11753

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE as Administrator of the
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioners, with the hopeful expectation that the
court will granrt their petition and afford them the privilege
of appearing amicus curiae in this matter, have prepared
this brief in support of tire Petitions for Rehearing that have
been filed by the plaJintiffs herein. This brief will develop
the reasons for rehearing or clarification set forth in said
petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The pl aintiffs 0btained a summary judgment, based
upon stipulated facts, from the triai court which rendered
1

1
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a memorandum deoision that held that the case of Worthen
V. Shurtleff & Andrews, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223
(1967), was controlling rather than the case of McConnell
V. Comm'r of Fin., 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394 ( 1962).
This decision was reverned by this Court, ho1ding that the
Worthen case would not be applied retroactively and that
the McConnell decision was controlling. ,Plwintiff.s-respondents have filed Petitions for Rehearing ':Seeking a reversal
of this Comt's opinion and affirmance of the district court
judgment. Because the present opinion of this Court is the
first holding in this State wi th respect to the important
rule of retroactivity of judicial decisions, and its effedt,
therefore, may be profound, petitioners join in seeking a
and reversal or a clarification of the holding of
the Court.
1

STATEMENT OF POSITION
In 1912, the Utah Legislature enacted Section 35-1-62,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall haYe
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same employment, the injured employe€, or in case of death his dependents,
may claim compensation and the injured employee
or his heirs or personal rep1·esentatives may also
have an action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer
or insurance carrier becomes obligaited to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall
become trustees of the cause of action against the
third party and may bring and maintain the action
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either in iits own name or in the name of the injured
employee, or his 'heirs or the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or car11ier may not settle and release the cause of action
w:ithout the consent of the commission.
If any recovery is obtained against such third
person it shall be disbursed as follows :

( 1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be pa;id and charged
proportionately against the partie.s as their interests
may appear.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
made.
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be ·applied
to reduce or satisfy in full any oblii.gation thereafter
accruing against the person liable for compensation.
In October, 1962, the Utah Supreme Court in McConnell v. Comm'r of Fin., supra, first discussed the effect
of Section 35-1-62. The essential facts in McConnell were
as follows:
( 1)

Plaintiff, while in the course and scope of his

employment was injured.
(2) The State Insurance Fund, as workmen's compensation carrier, paid compensation to plaintiff.
( 3)

Plaintiff recovered damages from the third-

party tortfeasor.
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( 4) Plaintiff reimbursed the State Insurance Fund
for workmen's compensation paid.
( 5) Plwintiff commenced an action against the State
Insurance Fund (Commission of Finance) to recover back
attorney's fees from the State Insurance Fund.
(6) The trial court awarded plaintiff summary
judgment, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding
as follows:
With relation to the disbursement of the proceeds in a recovery against a third party, the first
subsection of the statute gives a first prio:riity to
the payment of costs, including attorney's fees, of
the action. These expenses are to be apportioned
among the parties.
The second subsection gives a second priority
to the reimbursement in full to the insurance carrier made by it in way of compensation to the injured employee.

* * * in the instant case, the State lm>cE'ance Fund was not a party to the acti'On and did not
incur any legal expenses.
* * * If the plaintiff were right in his contention that an insurance carrier is liable for its
proportionate share of the costs and fees, then an
insurance carrier would never be reimbursed in
full. (Emphasis, the Court's.)
In April of 1967, the Utah Supreme Court decided
Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, supra. There the following facts appear:
(1)

ployment.

Plaintiff was injured in the course of his em-
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(2) Plaintiff received compensation from the State
Insurance Fund.
( 3) Plaintiff commenced an aotion against the thirdpa:r1ty tortfeasor, whiCJh case was settled and in which case,
plaiinrtJiff recovered his damages.
(4) The State Insurance Fund was then ordered into
the case for a determination as to how the recovery should
be disbursed, and to show cause why it should not be required to bear its share of the aittorney's fees.
( 5) The trial court awarded to plaintiff attorney's
fees as to the amount of reimbursement, and the Uta:h
Supreme Court affirmed, holding as follows:
Where .each of the parties [the injured employee and the insurance carrier] ha.s the right to
bring the action [against the third-party tortfeasor] and one takes the initiative and obtains a
recoviery for the benefit of both, it is only fair that
each bear his share of the expenses necessarily incurred in doing so. * * * In providing that if
recovery is oibtained against the third party the expenses including attorney's fees shall be charged
"proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear," it is to be noted that those terms
could not apply to the two parties in the original
acition (plaintiff Worthen and defendant Shurtleff
and Andrews) because Worthen receives from
Shurtleff and Andrews who have no further interest in it after paying it over. Therefore, the only
possible "parties" who have "interests" in the money
are Worthen and The State Insurance Fund (the
latter being entitled to reimbursement.) * * *
* * * When a statute undertakes an allo-
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cation of funds, the sequence in which it does so
should be regarded as having some significance.
* * * If rwe do as the staitute says and make the
allocation provided in paragraph (1) first, rthat 'is,
chargiing the recovery with the coots and attorney's
fees in proportion to the interests of the parities,
the disbursement sitated first 1is made first, and has
priority over the proviision for disbursement which
follows in paragraph (2). Then the re1imbursement
to ,the insurer is made from the funds
and to extent possible after the first requirement
for disbursement is complied with. ThJis application
of the statute can be reconciled with the requirement that the insurer be "reimbursed in full" by
vegarding that phrase simply meaning reimbuvsement for its full share after the pvior requirement
of the statute is fulfilled, and the 1insurer cannot be
compelled to take 'less than its proportionate share
in any compromise or settlement arranged by others.
(Emphasis, the Court's.)
Following the Worthen decision, a number of cases
with similar facts werie filed against the Utah Starte Department of Finance, as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund. 'The phvintiffs were compensation recipients
who had obtained recovery from third parties and who had
repaid the Fund in full the compensation received but with
a protes:t that the Fund should be requ'ired ito pay its proportionate amount of the attorneys' fees that had been incurred in the successful action against the third party.
'Jlhese cases were all consoiidated for itrial and a decision
favorable to plaintiffs rendered. This Court hars now rendered an opinion reversiing these plaintiffs' judgments in
Williams v. Utah State Dep't of Fin., Appea'I No. 11753.
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'f\he pertinent and essential facts 1were set forth in the opinion as follows :
Each plaiintiff 1) suffered on ..the-job injuries, 2)
receJived compensation from tthe Fund under the
Workmen'1s Compensation Act ('f\itle 35-1, U. C. A.
1953) 3) sued and recovered judgment against
third-party torlfeaisors, 4) paid the costs and attorneys' fees incident rtJhereto, 5) returned to the
Fund amounts they had received therefrom, 6) but
under protest, after refusal of the administrators
of ,the Fund to share 1in such expenses, 7) all of
which occurred before th!is court's decision in Worthen v. Shurtleff, which required those administering the Fund to share such expenses in a similar
case, but 8) after the then 8Ubsisting governing
case of McConnell v. Comm. of Finance was decided
by this court, which case was overru'led in a three
to two decision in the Wollthen case, insofar as it
was inconsistent with the latter decision.
The Court concluded:
That Worthen v. Shurtleff should not be applied
retroactively so as to permit the plaintiffs here to
recover part of their costs and attorneys' fees incident to theiir independent actions against thirdparty tortfeasors.
Another case was filed, following Worthen, by tv,ro
Salt Lake legal firms in the United Staites District Court
against an insurance carrier which had written cerrtain
workmen's compensation coverage. These lawyers had successfully handled a number of wrongful death action8 on
behalf of the heirs of certain workmen who had been killed
in the course of their employment. The heirs had received
compensa1tion awards against the insurance carrier as de-
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pendents of the dead workers and had been paiid a pavt of
such award when the recovery was effected from the thirdparty wrongdoer. All of the oompensia1Jion that had been
received was repari.d from :tJhe recovery and the lawyers
only charged attorneys' fees on that part of the recovery
which wa.s in excess of the total compensation that had
been awarded. This 1egial charge 1was made with the understanding that counsels' efforts had not been required by
nor had they es!tablished any part of the compensaltion
award which the clients had obtwined by operation of state
law. The suit was fliled against the insurance carr:ier by
these attorneys seeking a reasonable :Dee for their recovery
of the amount of ltJhe oompensation that had been paid and
the release of further unpaid amounts by reason of the
provisions of Section 3'5-1-62 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The Williams decision, while expressly limi,ted to the facts
involved in those particular cases, could arguably be urged
for the proposition that even under the different circumstances of this federal suit, recovery should be denied on a
theory that the Worthen decision can only operate on claims
accruing after the entry of such decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT HAS NOT APPLIED THE CORRECT RULE AS TO THE RETROACTIVITY
OF OVERRULING DECISIONS.
Appellant, Utah State Department of Finance, as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund, acknowledged in
its brief that "the majority of state coums havie held that
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decisions wiU be applied retroaotively" but then criticizes
sucih holdings on the ground !that the couPts had followed
the erroneous philosophy ,that they only interpreted ii.aw
and didn't create it and that an overruled decision "shouM
be trea;ted as if it never was" (Appellant's Brief pp. 4
& 5).
the legal writers relied upon by appellant for
the conclusions were correct in their observations is open
to question. A careful readling of many of the cases concerned with the question of whether to apply the rule of an
overruling decision retroactively or only prospectively reveals that the great majority of these cases held for a
retroactive appliication for the sake of uniformity and equal
treatment unless legal relations were affected that had
been entered into in reliance on the overruled decision. Such
cases created an exception to the general rule of retroactivity because to
a retroactive application in such circumstances would be contrary to the understanding and
reliance of the parties involved and produce unjust and inequitable results.
The following quote from appeHants' brief, setting
forth the so-called Austinfan view that is relied on by the
appellant, acknowledges this generaiJ. rule and exception:
Aus.tin maintained the judges do, in fact do something more than discover law; they make i.t, in many
instances. He advocated thaJt rather than be eras·ed
by a later deoision, an over-ruled decision is to be
considered a juridical fact and cases decided under it and relations entered into in reliance on it
are not to be distu11bed. (Appellant's Brief p. 6.)
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J.t is submitted that in the cases involved in this appeal

there are no relations entered 1into in reliance on the McConnell decislion nor do they involve any cases decided under McConnell any more than did the Worthen case.
Here, as in Worthen, the simple facts are that the compensation recipient hired counsel and expended costs in
seeking a recovery from a third person, which recovery, by
statute, had Ito
the interests and cla:ims of the compensation carrier. Such carrier was thus enabled :bo sit
back and let rsomeone else expend the time, money, and
effort on its behalf to obtaiin for it a full recovery with no
obligaJtion for such service and recovery.
The State Insurance Fund did not ,enter into legai relations, change its position or otherwise rely on the McConnell case to its detriment. The relationships and actions
of the parties in proceedings seeking recovery from a third
party pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-1-62 remain
the same whether the McConnell decision or the Worthen
decision is applied except as to equitable sharing in fees
and costs. The only detriment and inequity involved is in
the continued application of the McConnell decision after
it has been determined that the legislative interpretaJtion
contained therein was erroneous.
Appellant's contention that, by the decis ion in the
McConnell case, this court "created" the law rather than
"interpreted" it is clearly spurious. It cannot be
that courts can "create" law. The considerable criticism
of the recent past against :Vhe Supreme Court of the United
States for ,this practice graphrically establishes this fact.
1
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There is, however, no basis for the contention of appellant
that law was "created" by t}ilis 1Court fa the McConnell case,
for the Court was there merely interpreting the intention
of the legislature in passing Section 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This Williams decision, however, does subject this court to rtJhe criticism of "creating" law by "judicial legislation" for it in effect legislates a difference in the
application of the statute during the period of time between
the decision in the McConnell case and the one in the Worthen c&Se. This court in Worthen again interpreted the
legislative intent, concluded McConnell was ·erroneous, and
thereby reversed the effect of the same statute as to the
recovery of a:ttorney's fees from the compensation carrier.
Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, tbhis
statute shoold be applied uniformly and iin a non-discriminatory manner.
It is readily acknowledged that while the rule of retro-

acti vity is firmly entrenched as a basic premise of our
judicial syS1tem, it is not without certain exceptions which
are as well founded as the rule itself. The danger of the
oversimplification of such exoephons is neatly pointed out
by the appellant in its brief where it quotes authoritatively
from Ameriican Jurisprudence in support of the sweeping
proposition that "the overruling of a judioial construdtion
of a statute will not be given retroactive effect...." (Appellant's brief page 5.) The utilization by 1appellanrt of this
American Jurisprudence quote also points out the danger
of "black letter" legal conclusions from treatises which
oversimplify or overstate the nuances of fairly complicated
legal propositions. Indeed, the American Jurisprudence
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oversimplification is neither a full nor an accurate reflection of the liaw, nor does it purport to be, for the footnote
to the section cited by appellianrt; refers to a comment note
in 85 A. L. R. 262 in which 'it is stated:
The general principle 1is that a decision of a court
of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former
sion is retrospective in
operation, and the effect
is not that the former decision is bad faw, but that
it never was the law. To this the courts have established the exception that, where a constitutional
or statute law has received a given construe1tion by
the courts of last resort, and contracts have been
made and rights acqu:ired under and in accordance
with such construction, such contracts may not be
invalidated nor vested rights acquired under them
impaired by a cihange of construction made by a
subsequent decision .... The true rule in such cases
is held to be to give a change of judicial construction in respect to a statute the same effect in its

operation on contracts and existing contract rights
that would be given to a legislative repeal or amendment; that is to say, make it prospective, but not
retroactive. (Emphasis Added.)

The point is thus made clear that it is not because the
change of judicial construction involved a statute that required the application of an exception to the general rule
of retroactive application, but rather, because there were
contracts or contract rights that would be invalidated or
impaired unless such overruling decisions were given prospective effect only. Such an exception would apply not
only to overruling decisions involv:ing statutory interpretations but to any overruling decision where retroactive app]ication would subject persons who have justifiably relied
1
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on the overruled decision to substantial unfairness or undue
hardship.
The case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 77 L. Ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145
(1932), relied on by the ,appellant, supports this rule. The
Supreme Court there held at page 365, 287 U. S.:
A state in defining the liimits of adherance to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court,
though later overruled, are law none the less for
intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases
intbimating, too broadly (cf. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. Ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197,
supra), that it must give them that effect; but never
has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them
if !it P'leases, whenever injustice or hardship will
thereby be averted. [Citing cases.] * * * The
a1ternative is the same whether the subject of the
new decision is common law [Citing casas.] or statute. [Citing cases.] The choice for any state may be
determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges
of her coul'lts, their conceptions of law, its origin
and nature. (Emphasis, the Court's.)
This case involved a suit between a carrier and a shipper
for recovery of excass tariff charges. Because the carrier
and shipper were presumed to have bargained on the basis
of existing law including the judicial construction placed
on a statute, the Supreme Court of Montana provided that
its new rules with respect to such suits should operate prospectively only. Jusbice Cardozo in the decision did not speak
favorably of the Austinian approach as claimed by appel-
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lant bwt merely concluded that :bhe highest court of the state
may make a choice for itself whether the new rule shall
operate prospectively or retroactively, whether the subject
of the new decision is common law or the construction of
the statute.
For a number m other cases which Hkewise provide
for prospective application only where retroactive
tion would effect rights contracted or established in rel1i.ance on the prior decision, see the following cases.: Kelley
v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 P. 593 (1898); State v. Jones,
44 N. M. 623, 107 P. 2d 324 (1940);
County v.
Queen City Lodge No. 197, 1.0.0.F., 195 Okla. 131, 1'56
P. 2d 340 ( 1945) ; Linn County v. Rozelle, 177 Ore. 245,
162 P. 2d 150 (1945); Arizona State Tax Comm'n v. Ensign, 75 Amz. 376, 257 P. 2d 392 (1953); Forster Shipbuil,ding Co. v. Los Angeles County, 54 Cal. 2d 45, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 24, 353 P. 2d 736 (1960); State ex rel. Wash. State
Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P. 2d 833
( 1963).
1

H i'.S respectively submitted that unless ithis Court can
determine and find that the appellant had obtained vested
rig'hts in reliance on McConnell which would be invalidated
or impaired by the retroactive application of the Worthen
decision, or that appellant would be otherwise inequitably
harmed if retroactive effect were giiven to Worthen, or
that the rule :in Worthen can be fairly and adequately
effectuated without applying it retroactively, or that the
administration of justice would be unduly burdened by
retroactive applicatlion, the decision should be given retroactive effect.
1

19
POINT II.
ALLOWING RECOVERY IN THE WORTHEN
CASE AND DENYING RECOVERY HERE DEFEATS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND IS
ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, AND UNJUST.
'Dhe only differences in the facts of the Worthen case
and the cases at bar are that the plaintiff in Worthen obtained a favoraible decision from this court before the
claims of the plaintiffs in ,the other cases reached this
court, and that plaintiff in Worthen refused to pay the
State Insurance Fund before obtaining such a decision
while the pfain:tiffs here paid the Fund under proteslt.
These distirrctions do not logica:lly support a favorable result to the plaintif:f in the Worthen case and an unfavorable
one to the plaintiffs in these cases on a basis of denying
retroactive effect to the Worthen decision.
We have pointed out under Point I that the facts of
the cases involved in this Williams decision do not come
within any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule
of retroactive application of overruling decisions. Even,
however, if such facts did come within an exception to this
general rule and 1therefore require prospective effect only,
such prospective treatment should have been expressly
provided for in the Worthen decision together with a denial of recovery to the plaintiff in that case. In other words,
consistency and uniformi!ty require that only those cases
with claims arising after such decision was rendered should
have the benefit of the overruling decision.
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If the Court authorizes, as it did in Worthen, recovery
for a claJim which arose prior .to the overruling decision,
there is neither logk nor justice in denying recovery Ito
other similJar claims. Justice demands the ·equa;l treatment
of indistinguishable claims and a uniformity in the dispensaiton of a ru'le of la1w.
The propriety of departing from the general rule of
retroactivity by laying down a new rule to apply prospectively after a given date has been vigorously attacked by
Judge Rober't Von Moschzisker of Pennsylvania in an article iin 37 Harvard Law Review. He says at page 426:
Such a method would nolt only be plain and outright
legislation by the courts, but must prove quite ineffectua:l as a practical remedy, since parties would,
in all probability, be unwiHing to attack by litigation points already settled, when a new ruling would
alter the law only prospectively, and could not be
applied to their dispute. Furthermore, our judicial
system would have .to undergo a decidedly questionable change before judges would be willing to apply
one rule of la;w to the case before them, and lay
down an opposite one by which they and their successors should be bound in the future. Under onr
existing system the latter attempted ruling could
be nothing more than dicta.
This quote points up another problem inherent in the
Williams decision and that is that the Court, despite its
statement to the contrary, has engaged in "judicial legislation". Section 35-1-62 was enacted in 1945. In October
1962 the McConnell case was decided, interpreting this statute and concluding rthat the 'legislature intended to give the
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compensation carrier a full recovery of compensation payments made by it without incurring any obligation for legal
services rendered and coots expended to accomplish this
result on its behailf. In April 1967 the Worthen case again
reviewed this same statute and then interpreted the legislative intent to be exactly contrary to the previous holding
by deciding that the compensation carrier was obligated to
pay a reasonable fee for such services. Thus the Williams
decision, in denying a retroactive effect to the Worthen
ca..se and in effect denying that the legislative intent was
the same during all of the period of time from the enactment of the seeition in 1945 to the present, constitutes "judicial legislation" in which this court expressly stated that
it did not wish to engage.
POINT III.
THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS FOUND IN
THE WORTHEN AND WILLIAMS CASES
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL TO THE PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO A UNIFORM OPERATION AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW.
There are two significant provisions of the Utah Constitution which we submit are applicable in this case. They
are:
Article I, Section 2: "All political power is
inherent in the people; and all free governments are
1.

founded on their authority for their equal protection
and benefit, and they have the right to 'alter or reform
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their governments as the public welfare may require."
2. Artiicle I, iSection 24 : "All laws of the general
nature shall 'have uniform operartion."
It has been repeatedly pointed out that there are no
valid differences or distinctions between the plaintiff in
the Worthen case and the plaintiffs here whfoh would affect
the application of the concept of retroactivity. To apply
·different rules to the same causes denies unff orm operaition
of ithe law of thi·s Staite and the equal protection of the law
to !this citizens of thi.s Staite becrause such decisions are discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under the express provisions of the Utah
Constitution.
This Court, in State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d
920 (1938), stated the rule as follows:
It is only where some persons or transaction.s excluded from 1Jhe operation of the law are as to the
subject matter of the law in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation that the faw is
discriminatory in ithe sense of being arbitrary and
unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to diff erentiate those included from those excluded from its
operation can be found, it must be held constitutional.
* * * A classification is never unre2sonable or
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for the d'iff erentir.tion
between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided
the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to
the purposes to be accomplished by the act. (Emphasis added.)
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The Worthen decision was obviously intended to give
a correct judicial interpretation to the legislative intenrt in
passing Section 35-1-62. This case held that one of the legislative purposes to be accomplished by this section was to
require compensation carriers to bear a full proportionate
share of the legal expenses involved in effecting a recovery
from a third party. This interpretation is obviously just
and equitable, and there is no reasonable basis for absolving some compensation carriers of this obligation merely
becau.se a recovery was effected during a period of time
when an erroneous judicial interpretation of this section
was outstanding.
The McConnell case defeated the legislative purpose
and intent of equally distributing the expense in effectuating a recovery between the injured worker or his heirs and
the compensation carrier in third-party cases. Now that
this has been overruled and the controlling section correctly
interpreted, all injured workers or their heirn whose claims
are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations
should have the same right to recover the fees or costs expended by them that are allocable to the compensation carrier's interests. The desirability of such a result is even
cle8.rer in the case where an attorney directly sues the compensation carrier for his fees in representing the compensation carrier's interests where he has not attempted to
effect any collection of such fees, on the carrier's part of
the recovery, from the injured workman or his heirs.
The case of Toronto, et ux. v. Sheffield, et al., 118
Utah 462, 222 P. 2d 594 (1950), is enlightening and per-
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suasive on the necessity for uniformity and equal protection of law. This case involved an act of the legislature
which distinguished between real estate sold for delinquent
taxes before 1939 and similar sales made after 1939. In
holding such distinctions unoonstitutional, this Court stated
at page 599, 222 P. 2d:
Our State Constitution, Article I, section 24
provides that "all laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation." And Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution
forbids any state to "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". ':' ':' *

* * *
Here, there is no basis whatever for the distinction made. The conditions surrounding the sale
to the county under [statute] since the 1939 amendment and the objects and purposes thereof are exactly the same as those of [earlier and similar statute] prior to that amendment. The only factual
difference whatever is a slight change in the procedure and the fact that the sale made under the
former statute must have been made before the one
under the present statute and therefore deals with
a claim which is more stale. Certainly that fact
would not justify the distinction of barring the
newer claims while not barring the older ones. We
therefore conclude that this differentiation between
these two classes of sales bears no reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by this act
and therefore hold that the discrimination against
persons who as plaintiffs here purchased tax titles
transferred to the county under the statute in effect
prior to the 1939 amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore is unconstitutional.
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See also the following cases in which the Utah Supreme
Court has held legislative acts to be violative of the uniform operation of law required of the Utah Constitution:
State V. Bayer, 34 Utah 257, 97 P. 2d 129 (1908); Salt Lake
City v. Utah Power & Light, 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067
(1914); State V. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894 ( 1921),
aff'd, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. Ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273; Gronlund
v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464 (1948);
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.
2d 97 4 (1961); and Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah
2d 412, 375 P. 2d 756 ( 1962).
The Fourteentih Amendment to the United States Constitution is likewise violated by the decision in the Williams
case as a denial to the plaintffs of "equal protection of the
laws." The equal protection clause, of course, covers all
forms of governmental action whether legislative, judicial
or executive. It protects citizens against unequal treatment
by reason of arbitrary distinctions and differences. Because
there are no real logical distinctions between the cases involved in the Williams appeal and the Worthen case with
respect to the issue of retroactivity, the adverse Williams
decision constitutes a denial of equal protection of laws.
See Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U. S. 231, 74 S. Ct.
505, 98 L. Ed. 660 (Mo. 1954), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
POINT IV.
IF THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE TO
FIND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS, SAID DETER1HNATION SHOULD NOT BE ON THE BASIS
OF REJECTING RETROACTIVITY.
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This Court has pointed ourt in its majority opinion that
said opinion should ibe confined to the "particular circumstances of the instant cases." Indeed it h as gone so far as
to say "this is not to say that there cannot 'be decisions that
have retroacrbive effect in a given set of circumstances." In
addition, the special concurrence of Mr. Justice Ellett indicates that other factors present in the instant cases may
very well have influenced the Court in arriving at its ultimate decision. As a matter of fact, we suspect that the
principle enunciaited in rthe case of Baugh v. Darley, 112
Utah l, 184 P. 2d 335 (1947), may have had a greater influence in bringing about the ultimate decision than the
concept of retroactivity.
1

Section 35-1-62 provides that from any third-party
recovery "the reasonable expense of the action, including
attorney's fees, should be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear." Any
claim for attorney's fees would enure to counsel rendering
the service and would be charged agains,t the share of the
proceeds recovered by the defendant Insurance Fund.
The payment by the plaintiffs to their attorneys of an
attorney's fee on the portion of the recovery from the third
party which fully satisfied the compensation award and
thus made the State Insurance Fund whole would be graturtous and officious. The Restatement of Restitution, Section 2, sets forth the rule that "a person who officiously
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution
therefor." See also 17 C. J. S. "Contracts" Section 6 at
page 573. The Restatement of Restitution, Section 1 (b)

27
at page 12, defines a "benefit" :in the
1tract or unjust enrichment as follows:

of quasi con-

b. What constitutes a 'benefit. A person confers a
benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial :to or at the request of rthe other, satisfies a debt
or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the
other's security or advantage. (Emphasis added.)
In Baugh v. Darley, supra, plaintiff sought restitution
for alleged unjust enrichment conferred upon defendant
by reason of efforts expended by him in procuring a purchaser for defendant's land, the possession of which the
plaintiffs held under an oral agreement to sell to plaintiff.
The court stated:
The mere fact that a person benefits another is not
of itself sufficient to require the other to make restitution therefor. Restatement of Restitution, Sec.
1, comment c. Services officiously or gratuitously
furnished are not recoverable. Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 2. Nor are services performed by the
plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which the
defendant benefits incidentally, recoverable. See Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 40, comment c; and
Sec. 41 (a) (i).
See also Chandler v. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash.
2d 591, 137 P. 2d 97 (1943); Cf. Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 79, 230 P. 2d 816 (1951); Brown V. Thornton, 150
Mont. 150, 432 P. 2d 386 (1967); Osborne v. Boeing Airplane Co., 309 F. 2d 99 (9th Cir., 1962).
We submit that this Honorwble Court should have a
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fresh opportunity to reconsider its decision against the
:Plaintiffs and if, after such reconsiderattion, it is still satisfied that they shou1d n'Ot recover, it should decide whether
such adverse rulring would be better premised on the basis
of lthe Baugh case rather than on fue denial of retroactivity
with its inequitaible and
impl'ications.
1

1

We come back once agaiin to the fundamental concept
thaJt the legislative intent was to allow attorneys to recover
fees on compensation awards required by statute to be recovered in /third-party cases and rtha.it a denial of retroactive
recovery plainly and simply constitutes an unnecessary
broadcast of rinjusttice throughout the state.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court
should grant our Petition Ibo appear amicus curiae and
should grant a reheari.ng for ithe :following reaisons :
First, this Court has clearly pronounced ithe legislative
intent wihen Seotion 3'5-1-62 was passed into law in the year
194'5. That legislaJtive intent was to eliminate free rides
for compensation carriers in third-party cases. The statute, thusly interpreted, has eliminated injustice and made
eaoh interested party bear its share of attorneys' fees and
costs. There is absolutely no defensible reason why this
injustice should be perpetrated not only on ,the seven here,
but upon other similarly s'ituated lriltiganits throughout the

state.
Second, to allow recovery to the first litigant to reach
the courtroom, Worthen, and deny iit to aH others similarly
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situated, constitutes judicial discriminaiti on between classes
equally entitled to the 'benefits of staJtu'te. It is our position
that this decision would constitute a violation of "uniform
operation" of 1aws and "equal protection and benefit" of
laws contrary to the Uta:h Constitution. The same decision
would likewise violate rthe "equal protection of faws" provision of the United States Constitution.
1

And, third, if the majority of this Honorable Court
has reasons other than an ouitright refusal to allow retroactive appliication of the Worthen interpretation, as would
seem to be the case in view of the special concurrence and
careful language in the majority opinion confining same
to the facts of the seven cases now before the Court, then
the Bench and Bar should be so advised so that obvious injustice stemming from ·the concept of denied retroactive
application of the Worthen interpretation can be eliminated
from Utah law.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID K. WATKISS
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.

